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We show that some customers, whom we call ‘Harbingers’ of failure, systematically purchase 
new products that flop.  Their early adoption of a new product is a strong signal that a 
product will fail - the more they buy, the less likely the product will succeed.  Firms can 
identify these customers either through past purchases of new products that failed, or through 
past purchases of existing products that few other customers purchase. We discuss how these 
insights can be readily incorporated into the new product development process. Our findings 
challenge the conventional wisdom that positive customer feedback is always a signal of 
future success.   
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Introduction 
Decades of research emphasizes that customer feedback is a critical input throughout the new 
product development process.  A central premise of this customer-focused process is that 
positive feedback is good news.  The more excited that customers are about a prototype, the 
more likely it is that a firm will continue to invest.  When firms move to the final stages of 
testing and launching a new product, metrics of success shift from likes and dislikes to actual 
product sales.  Here again, conventional wisdom is that more product sales indicate a greater 
likelihood of long-term success. This assumption is fundamental to nearly every new product 
forecasting model (Bass 1969; Mahajan, Muller and Bass 1990). 
In this paper, we challenge this commonly held assumption.  We show that not all positive 
feedback should be viewed as a signal of future success.  In particular, using detailed 
transaction data from a chain of convenience stores, we show that increased sales of a new 
product by some customers can be a strong signal of future failure.   
At first glance, the result is striking.  How can more product sales signal future failure?  After 
all, meeting sales targets is the litmus test of all new products. We present evidence that this 
result is driven by the existence of an unrepresentative subset of customers. We label these 
latter customers ‘Harbingers’ of failure. Harbingers are more likely to purchase products that 
other customers do not buy, and so a purchase by these customers may indicate that the 
product appeals to a narrower slice of the marketplace. This yields a signal that the product is 
more likely to fail. 
We identify these customers in two ways. Our primary focus is on customers who have 
previously purchased new products that failed. We show that the tendency to buy hits or flops 
is systematic.  If a customer tends to buy failures, then the next new product they purchase is 
more likely to be a failure.  For example, customers who tend to purchase a successful 
product like a Swiffer mop are more likely to buy other ultimately successful products, like 
Arizona Iced Tea. In contrast, if a customer tends to buy flops, then their next purchase is 
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also more likely to fail.  For example, customers who purchased Diet Crystal Pepsi are more 
likely to have purchased Frito Lay Lemonade (both of which failed).   
It is not only the initial purchase of new products by Harbingers that is informative, but also 
the decision to purchase again.  A one-time purchase of Diet Crystal Pepsi is partially 
informative about a consumer’s preferences.  However, a consumer who repeatedly 
purchases Diet Crystal Pepsi is even more likely to have unusual preferences, and is more 
likely than other customers to choose other new products that will fail in the future.    
The second way to identify Harbingers focuses on purchases of existing products.  This 
second approach is motivated by evidence that customers who systematically buy new 
products that fail are also more likely to buy niche existing products.  This suggests that a 
tendency to purchase niche existing products may identify Harbingers. The findings reveal 
that both approaches are similarly effective at identifying Harbingers, and that distinguishing 
between early adopters of new products using either metric can significantly improve 
predictions of long term success or failure.  
Related Literature 
Our results complement several literatures, including literatures on preference minorities, 
representativeness, lead users, and new product forecasting.  We discuss each of these next. 
We identify Harbingers either through past purchases of new products that failed, or through 
past purchases of existing products that few other customers buy. In both cases, Harbingers 
reveal preferences that are unusual compared to the rest of the population.  The term 
“preference minorities” was previously coined by Joel Waldfogel (and his co-authors) to 
describe customers with unusual preferences. The existence of these customers has been used 
recently to explain the growth of Internet sales in some product categories.  Offline retailers 
tend to allocate their scarce shelf space to the dominant preferences in that market, so 
customers whose preferences are not representative may not find products that suit their 
needs (Anderson 1979; Waldfogel 2003). Choi and Bell (2011) show that, as a result, 
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preference minorities are more likely to purchase from the Internet, and are less price 
sensitive when doing so (see also Brynjolfsson, Hu and Rahman 2009). Preference minorities 
also help to explain why we see a longer tail of niche items purchased in Internet channels, 
compared to other retail channels (Brynjolfsson, Hu and Smith 2003; Brynjolfsson, Hu and 
Simester 2011).1 
Lack of representativeness of customer preferences also underpins Geoffrey Moore’s (1991) 
explanation that new technology products often fail because they are unable to “cross the 
chasm.”  He argues that early adopters of technology are more likely to be technology 
enthusiasts and visionaries and argues that the mainstream market has different (more risk 
averse) preferences.  Early success may therefore not be a predictor of future success. We 
caution that Moore’s explanation is focused primarily on the adoption of disruptive new 
technologies that represent significant innovations over existing products.  The role of 
technology enthusiasts is less apparent in the consumer packaged goods markets that we 
study.   
Van den Bulte and Joshi (2007) formalize Moore’s explanation by modeling the diffusion of 
innovation in markets with segments of “influentials” and “imitators.”  They show that 
diffusion in such a market can exhibit a dip between the early and later parts of the diffusion 
curve, but that this depends on the extent to which the influential segment affects the 
imitators.  They offer five different theories of consumer behavior that may explain this 
result.  When extended to our setting, these theories may partially explain why we observe 
Harbingers making systematically different purchasing decisions than other customers, and 
why the new products that they purchase tend to fail.  However, many of these theories also 
predict that one segment of customers will influence the purchasing decisions of other 
customers.  In contrast, our explanation does not require that a group of customers influence 
the decisions of others.  Moreover, in our consumer packaged goods setting, it is not obvious 
                                                          
1 Huang, Singh and Srinivasan (2014) use a similar explanation to argue why some crowdsourcing participants 
may offer worse ideas than other participants.   
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that dependency between different customers’ purchasing decisions is as large an effect as it 
is in technology markets.  
This is not the first paper to recognize that the feedback of certain customers should be 
weighted differently in the new product development process. In particular, the lead user 
literature argues for giving greater weight to positive feedback from some customers. Rather 
than relying on information from a random or representative set of customers, the lead user 
process proposes collecting information from customers on the “leading edges” of the 
market.  The rationale for this approach is that these leading customers are more likely to 
identify “breakthrough” ideas that will result in product differentiation (von Hippel 1986).  
There have been many studies seeking to validate these benefits.  For example, Urban and 
von Hippel (1988) study the computer-aided design (CAD) market and show that reliance on 
lead users results in new product concepts that are preferred by potential users over concepts 
generated by traditional product development methods.  Lilien, Morrison, Searls, Sonnack 
and von Hippel (2002) report findings from a natural experiment at 3M, exploiting variation 
in the adoption of lead user practices across 3M’s business units.  They find that annual sales 
of product ideas generated using a lead user approach are expected to yield eight times more 
revenue than products generated using traditional approaches.  Our results complement this 
literature; while early adoption by lead users may presciently signal new product success, 
there also exist customers whose adoption is an early signal of product failure.    
All of the new product introductions we study had survived initial pilot testing. Yet despite 
these screens, only 40% of the new products in our data survive for three years. This raises 
the question: How did the products that failed ever make it through the initial market tests? 
The new product development literature has identified escalated commitment (Boulding, 
Morgan and Staelin 1997; Brockner and Rubin 1985; Brockner 1992,), an inability to 
integrate information (Biyalagorsky, Boulding and Staelin 2006) and distortions in 
management incentives (Simester and Zhang 2010) as possible explanations.  Our 
identification of this class of Harbingers provides an alternative explanation.  If customers 
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who initially adopt the product have unusual preferences that are different from other 
customers, then high initial sales may not signal future success.   
Most new product forecasting models focus on predicting new product outcomes using an 
initial window of sales.  Perhaps the best-known new product forecasting model was 
introduced by Bass (1969). An important characteristic of the Bass model is an assumed 
interaction between current adopters and potential adopters of the new product. The speed of 
diffusion depends on the degree to which later adopters imitate the early adopters. As we 
discussed, our explanation does not require dependency between different customers’ 
purchasing decisions (and this effect may be relatively weak in the types of markets that we 
study). Moreover, a central prediction of these models is that a positive initial response is a 
signal of positive future outcomes.2  Our findings indicate that this central premise may not 
hold if the positive initial response reflects purchases by Harbingers. 
Another stream of new product forecasting models focuses on predicting success before the 
product has been launched on the market.  The absence of market data means that pre-market 
forecasts are generally considered less accurate than forecasts that use an initial window of 
post-launch sales.  However, if the cost of launch is sufficiently high, then pre-market tests 
can provide information to evaluate whether to invest in a new product launch. Urban and 
Hauser (1993) review nine different approaches to pre-market testing.  Some approaches rely 
on experience with past new products to estimate the relationship between advertising, 
promotion and distribution response functions (see for example the NEWS model proposed 
by Pringle, Wilson and Brody 1982).   Other approaches obtain estimates of trial and repeat 
purchase rates, and use these as inputs in a dynamic stochastic model to estimate cumulative 
sales (see for example Eskin and Malec 1976).  The estimates of the trial and repeat 
parameters are obtained from various sources.  For example, some models use pre-market 
field tests (Parfitt and Collins 1968), while others use laboratory tests. Perhaps the best 
known of the laboratory models is ASSESSOR, proposed by Silk and Urban (1978).  
                                                          
2 In a recent study, Morvinski, Amir and Muller (2014) show that this prediction holds only when the initial 
positive response is from similar customers and when the uncertainty about the product quality is low. 
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Respondents are exposed to advertising and given an opportunity to purchase in a simulated 
store.  The laboratory purchase rates are combined with estimates of availability and 
awareness to predict initial market adoption, while repeat purchase rates are estimated from 
mail order repurchases.3   
The principle underlying models of trial and repeat purchasing is that adoption can be 
influenced by the firm’s investments in advertising, distribution and promotion.  However, 
long-term success depends upon customers accepting the product, often to the exclusion of a 
product they were previously using (Parfitt and Collins 1968; Eskin 1973; Fader and Hardie 
2005). Repeat purchase rates may therefore provide a more accurate predictor of new product 
success than initial adoption rates.  For this reason, we use both initial adoption and repeat 
purchases to classify customers.  Specifically, we ask whether customers who repeatedly 
purchase new products that fail provide a more accurate signal of new product failure than 
customers who only purchase the new product once. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we describe the data 
in detail, including a summary of how long unsuccessful new products remain in the store 
and the opportunity cost of these failures to the retailer.  Then, we present initial evidence 
that there exist customers whose decision to adopt a new product is a signal that the product 
will fail.  We also conduct a wide range of checks to evaluate the robustness of the findings. 
Next, we investigate who the Harbingers are, and explore whether they can also be identified 
through purchases of (existing) niche items. We summarize our findings and their 
implications in the last section. 
Data and Initial Results 
This paper uses two datasets: a sample of individual customer transaction data, and a sample 
of aggregate store-level transaction data.  Both datasets come from a large chain of 
                                                          
3 A final class of premarket forecasting models compares customers’ attitudes to the new product with attitudes 
to existing products.  The challenge for these attitude approaches is to accurately map customer attitudes to 
actual purchase probabilities. 
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convenience stores with many branches across the United States.  The store sells products in 
the beauty, consumer healthcare, edibles and general merchandise categories.  Customers 
visit the store frequently (on average almost weekly), and purchase approximately four items 
per trip at an average price of approximately $4 per item.   
The store level transaction data includes aggregate weekly transactions for every item in a 
sample of 111 stores spread across 14 different states in the Midwestern and Southwestern 
portions of the US.  The data period extends from January 2003 through October 2009. We 
use the store-level transaction data to define new product survival, and to construct product 
covariates for our multivariate analysis. We exclude seasonal products that are designed to 
have a short shelf life, such as Christmas decorations and Valentine's Day candy.   
The individual-customer data covers over ten million transactions made using the retailer’s 
frequent shopping card between November 2003 and November 2005 for a sample of 
127,925 customers.  The customers represent a random sample of all of the customers who 
used the frequent shopping card in the 111 stores during this period.  Their purchase histories 
are complete, and record every transaction in any of the firm’s stores (in any geographic 
region) using the retailer's frequent shopping card.  We focus on purchases of new products 
that were made between November 2003 and November 2005 and are within 52 weeks of the 
product’s introduction.  There are 77,744 customers with new product purchases during this 
period.  They purchase a total of 8,809 different new products with a total of 439,546 
transactions distributed across 608 product categories.  Examples of these new products 
include: Paul Mitchell Sculpting Foam Mousse, Hershey’s wooden pencils, SpongeBob 
children’s shoelaces, and Snackwell sugar free shortbread cookies.  
New Product Success  
We will initially define a product as a “failure” if its last transaction date (in the store-level 
transaction data) is less than 3 years after its introduction.4  If the last transaction date is after 
                                                          
4 Product success is evaluated using store-level data, which contains purchases by all customers and includes 
customers who purchased without using a card.  To the extent that customers using a loyalty card are different 
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this date then the product is a “success”.  This definition of success is relatively strict (the 
product has to survive a minimum of 36 months), and so we also investigate how robust our 
findings are to using a shorter survival horizon.  In addition, we consider several alternative 
measures of success, including accuracy in a holdout sample, the market share of the new 
item, and how long the item survived in the market. 
Across the full sample of 8,809 new products, 3,508 (40%) survived for 3 years (12 
quarters).5  Other research has reported similar success rates for new products in consumer 
packaged goods markets.  For example, Liutec, Du and Blair (2012) cite success rates of 
between 10% and 30%.  Similarly, Barbier et al. (2005), report success rates of between 14% 
and 47%.  In evaluating whether a success rate of 40% is high or low, it is important to 
recognize that these new products have all survived the retailer’s initial market tests and are 
now broadly introduced across the retailer’s stores.  If we were able to observe the full 
sample of new products that were either proposed by manufacturers or that were subjected to 
initial market tests by this retailer, then the success rate would be considerably lower.  
The Cost of New Product Failure 
As a preliminary investigation, we compared profits earned in the first year of a new 
product’s life for new products that ultimately succeeded or failed. Throughout the first year, 
flops contribute markedly lower profits than hits do. This has an important implication for the 
retailer.  Because shelf space is scarce (the capacity constraint is binding) the retailer incurs 
an opportunity cost when introducing a new product that fails (and when keeping them in the 
stores). Introducing a flop and keeping it for one year results in lost profits equivalent to 49% 
of the average annual profits for an existing item in the category.  The implication is that new 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
from other customers, we would expect this to make it more difficult to predict store-level outcomes.  Therefore, 
any selection bias introduced by the loyalty cards hinders rather than contributes to our findings.  Similarly, we 
will use individual customer transactions at all of the firm’s stores, not just the 111 stores for which we have 
aggregate weekly data (recall that all of the customers not only made purchases in the 111 stores during our data 
period, but they also made purchases in other stores).  We will later investigate how this affects the results by 
limiting attention to purchases in the 111 stores, or by only considering purchases outside those stores. 
5 The average survival duration for the 5,301 failed items was 84.68 weeks, or approximately 21 months. In the 
Appendix we report a histogram (Figure A1) describing how long new products survive. 
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product mistakes are very costly.  The more accurately the retailer can predict which new 
products will succeed (and the faster it can discontinue flops), the more profitable it will be.   
It is important to recognize that throughout this paper we do not make any distinctions based 
on the reasons that a new product fails.  Instead we will consider which customers purchase 
new products that succeed or fail, and identify customers (‘Harbingers’) whose purchases 
signal that a new product is likely to fail. We will also show that the retailer can more quickly 
identify flops if it distinguishes which customers initially purchase a new product, rather than 
just how many customers purchase.  We begin this investigation in the next section.   
Do Purchases by Some Customers Predict Product Failure? 
Firms often rely on customer input to make decisions about whether to continue to invest in 
new products.  Our analysis investigates whether the way that firms treat this information 
should vary for different customers.  In particular, we consider the retailer’s decision to 
continue selling a new product after observing a window of initial purchases, and show how 
this decision can be improved if the retailer distinguishes between Harbingers and non-
Harbingers. Although our initial analysis focuses on customers prior purchases of new 
products that failed, we later also investigate whether we can identify Harbingers through 
their prior purchases of existing products. In particular, we identify customers who tend to 
purchase niche items that few other customers purchase. 
Our initial analysis proceeds in two steps.  First, we use a sample of new products to group 
customers according to how many flops they purchased in the weeks after the product is 
introduced.  We then investigate whether purchases in the first 15 weeks by each group of 
customers can predict the success of a second sample of new products. We label this 15 
weeks the “initial evaluation period.” We demonstrate the robustness of the findings by 
varying how we select the groups of products, varying the length of the initial evaluation 
period that we use to predict new product success, and varying the metrics used to measure 
success.   
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The unit of analysis is a (new) product, and we assign the products into two groups according 
to the date of the new product introduction.  We will initially assign products introduced 
between November 2003 and July 2004 to product set A (the “classification” set). The 
classification set contains 5,037 new products, of which 1,958 (38.9%) survive 3 years.  New 
products introduced between July 2004 and July 2005 are assigned to product set B (the 
“prediction” set).6 The prediction set contains 2,935 new products, including 1,240 (42.2%) 
successes.  We will later investigate varying these demarcation dates and also randomly 
assigning products to the prediction and classification sets. 
If the classification and prediction sets contain new products that are variants of the same 
item, this may introduce a spurious correlation between the failure rates for the two groups of 
items.  For example, it is possible that the classification set includes a new strawberry 
flavored yogurt and the prediction set includes a new raspberry flavor of the same yogurt.  It 
is plausible that the success of these products is correlated as the firm may choose to continue 
or discontinue the entire product range.  For this reason, we restrict attention to new products 
for which there is only a single color or flavor variant.  This ensures that products in the 
validation set are not merely a different color or flavor variant of a product in the 
classification set.  It also ensures that the products are all truly new, not just new variants of 
an existing product.   
Grouping Customers Using the Classification Product Set 
To group customers according to their purchases of products in the classification set, we 
calculate the proportion of new product failures that customers purchased in the initial 
evaluation period and label this as the customer’s FlopAffinityi:   
                                                          
6 Transactions in the first 15 weeks after a new product is introduced are used to predict the product’s success.  
Therefore, we cannot include products introduced between July 2005 and November 2005 in the prediction set 
as we do not observe a full 15 weeks of transactions for these items. 
FlopAffinityi =  Total number of flops purchased from classification setTotal number of new products purchased from classification set. (1) 
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We classify customers who have purchased at least two new products during the product’s 
first year into four groups, according to their FlopAffinity.  These include 29,436 customers, 
which represents approximately 38% of all the customers in the sample. The 25th, 50th, and 
75th percentiles are a flop rate of 25%, 50%, and 67%.   Therefore, we use the following four 
groupings: 
 Group 1: Between 0% and 25% flops (25th percentile) in the classification set  
Group 2: Between 25% and 50% flops (50th percentile) in the classification set  
Group 3: Between 50% and 67% flops (75th percentile) in the classification set 
Group 4: Over 67% flops in the classification set 
Although we use these percentiles to group customers, the number of customers in each 
group varies because a disproportionally large number of customers have a flop rate of 0%, 
50% or 100%.  The groups sizes (for groups 1 through 4) are: 8,151 (28%), 4,692 (16%), 
10,105 (34%) and 6,515 (22%).  There are also 48,308 “other” customers who are not 
classified into a group, because they did not purchase at least two new products in the 
classification set. 
The focus of the paper is investigating whether these different groups of customers can help 
predict success or failure of products in the prediction set.     
Predicting the Success of New Products in the Prediction Set 
Recall that the prediction set includes new products introduced after the products in the 
classification set.  We will use purchases in the initial evaluation period (the first 15 weeks) 
to predict the success of the new products in the prediction set.  We estimate two competing 
models.  The competing models are both binary logits, where the unit of analysis is a new 
product indexed by j and the dependent variable, 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑗, is a binary variable indicating 
whether the new product survived for at least 3 years.  The first model treats all customers 
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equally, while the second model distinguishes between the four groups of customers. In 
particular, the probability that product j is a success (pj) is modeled as: 
Model 1:  ln � 𝑝𝑗
1−𝑝𝑗
� = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗      (2) 
Model 2: ln � 𝑝𝑗
1−𝑝𝑗
� =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 1 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗   (3)  + 𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 3 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 4 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗  +𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑗 
The Total Sales measure counts the total number of purchases of the new product during the 
initial evaluation period.  The Group x Sales measures count the total number of purchases by 
customers in Groups 1-4.  The Sales to Other Customers measures purchases by customers 
who are not classified (because they did not purchase at least two new products in the 
classification set).  Therefore, the difference between the two models is that the first model 
aggregates all sales without distinguishing between customers.  The second model 
distinguishes purchases according to the outcomes of the customers’ classification set 
purchases.   
These sales measures are all calculated using purchases in the first 15 weeks after the new 
product is introduced.  Average marginal effects from both models are reported in Table 1.  
We report the likelihood ratio comparing the fit of Models 1 and 2, together with a Chi2 test 
statistic measuring whether the improvement in fit is significant. We also report the area 
under the ROC curve (AUC). The AUC measure is used in the machine learning literature, 
and is equal to the probability that the model ranks a randomly chosen positive outcome 
higher than a randomly chosen negative outcome.7 The closer this is to one, the more 
accurate the classifier.  For both of these metrics (and for the additional success metrics we 
report later in this section), we compare Models 1 and 2.  This represents a direct evaluation 
of whether we can boost predictive performance over standard models that forecast the 
                                                          
7 The ROC curve represents the fraction of true positives out of the total actual positives vs. the fraction of false 
positives out of the total actual negatives.   
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outcome of new products using the number of initial purchases. In later analysis we will 
extend this comparison to not only consider initial trial of the product, but also repeat 
purchases (see for example Eskin 1973). 
Table 1 about here 
The Chi-square statistics and AUC measures both confirm that distinguishing initial 
purchases by Harbingers from other customers can significantly improve decisions about 
which new products to continue selling.  Recall that the dependent variable is a binary 
variable indicating whether the product succeeded.  Positive marginal effects indicate a 
higher probability of success, while negative marginal effects indicate the reverse.  In Model 
1 we see that higher Total Sales is associated with a higher probability of success.  This is 
exactly what we would expect: products that sell more are more likely to be retained by the 
retailer.  In Model 2 we observe positive marginal effects for customers in Groups 1 and 2, 
but negative marginal effects for customers in Groups 3 and 4.  Purchases by customers in 
each group are informative, but they send different signals.  Notably, purchases by 
Harbingers (represented by customers in Groups 3 and 4) are a signal of failure: If sales to 
these customers are high, the product is more likely to fail.  
Our two models do not contain any controls for product covariates. However, we can easily 
add covariates to each model.  To identify covariates we focus on variables that have 
previously been used in the new product development literature (see for example Henard and 
Szymanski 2001).  Our focus is on controlling for these variables rather than providing a 
causal interpretation of the relationships.  A detailed definition of all the control variables is 
provided in the Appendix, together with summary statistics (Tables A1 and A2).  The 
findings when including product covariates are also included in Table 1 (as Models 3 and 4).  
We see that that the negative effect of sales from Group 4 on new product success persists.  
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Are Repeat Purchases More Informative? 
Previous research has suggested that it is not just a customer’s initial purchase of a product 
that is informative, but also whether the customer returns and repeats that purchase (Eskin 
1973; Parfitt and Collins 1968).  Therefore, we investigate whether repeat purchases of a new 
product that subsequently failed are more informative about which customers are Harbingers 
than just a single purchase.   To address this question, we identify new products that are 
purchased repeatedly by the same customer in the classification set (during the initial 
evaluation period).  In particular, we redefine FlopAffinity as:  
Repeated FlopAffinityi(n) = 
𝑥𝑖(𝑛)
𝑦𝑖(𝑛)        (4) 
where 𝑥𝑖(𝑛) equals the number of flops customer i purchased at least n times in the 
classification set, and 𝑦𝑖(𝑛) equals the total number of new products customer i purchased at 
least n times in the classification set. 
We use this definition to group customers by their Repeated FlopAffinity.  To investigate the 
relationship between the Repeated FlopAffinity groups and the success of products in the 
prediction set we vary the minimum number of purchases, n, from one to three.  There are 
fewer customers who make repeat purchases of the products in the classification set, so we 
aggregate customers in Groups 1 and 2 and customers in Group 3 and 4. The findings are 
reported in Table 2.   
Insert Table 2 about here. 
When n is equal to 1, the definition in Equation (4) is equivalent to that in Equation (1).  We 
include it to facilitate comparison. Using the new definition, we find the same pattern that 
sales from Harbingers significantly reduce the likelihood of success. Notably, the marginal 
effects for Groups 3 and 4 are larger as n becomes larger. This suggests that a new product is 
even more likely to fail if the sales come from customers who repeatedly purchase flops.   
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Embracing the Information that Harbingers Provide 
Notice that the findings indicate that the firm should not simply ignore purchases by 
Harbingers, because their purchases are informative about which products are likely to fail.  
In particular, if we omit purchases by customers in Groups 3 and/or 4, the model is less 
accurate in explaining which products succeed.  Notice also that when sales to Groups 3 and 
4 groups are included, the model is able to give greater weight to purchases by other 
customers whose adoption is a strong signal that the product will succeed.  This is reflected in 
the much larger positive marginal effect of sales to customers in Groups 1 and 2 (Model 2) 
compared to the marginal effect for Total Sales (Model 1). The large, significant effect for 
Groups 1 and 2 (see also Table 2, Model 2 At Least 1 purchase) provides some evidence that 
there may also exist customers whose purchases signal that a product is more likely to 
succeed (i.e., Harbingers of Success). 
A simple counterfactual exercise can illustrate the danger of simply ignoring purchases by 
Harbingers.  Suppose that half of the demand is contributed by customers who have high 
FlopAffinity (Group 4), while the remaining sales are equally distributed between the other 
three groups (and the unclassified “other” customers).  Using the calibrated parameters, we 
predict that the probability of success drops from 39.51% to 0.67% as total unit sales increase 
from 0 to 100.  By contrast, if half of the demand comes from Group 1 (and the other half is 
equally distributed across the other three groups and the “other” customers), then the 
probability of success increases from 39.51% to 71.83% as sales increase from 0 to 100 units.  
These results are illustrated in Figure 1.  Distinguishing between these customers leads to 
very different predictions of product success.    
Figure 1 about here 
We can also illustrate how the probability of success changes as the fraction of sales 
contributed by Harbingers increases.  We merge Groups 3 and 4 and define these customers 
as Harbingers (customers with FlopAffinity between 0.5 and 1).  We calibrate the models with 
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the merged groups (as reported in Table 2) and report the findings in Figure 2.  Holding Total 
Sales fixed (at the average level), as the percentage of sales contributed by Harbingers 
increases from 25% to 50%, the probability of success decreases by approximately 31%.  The 
success probability decreases even faster when we group customers using repeat purchases 
(Repeated FlopAffinity).  Using at least two purchases to group customers, the probability of 
success drops 37%, and when using at least three purchases the drop is 56% (as the fraction 
of sales contributed by repeat Harbingers increases from 25% to 50%).  
Figure 2 about here 
Summary 
We have presented evidence that customers who have tended in the past to purchase new 
products that failed can help signal whether other new products will fail. The signal is even 
stronger if these customers purchase the new product repeatedly.  In the next section we 
investigate the robustness of this result.   
Robustness Checks and Results by Product Category 
In this section we conduct several checks to evaluate the robustness of the findings, including 
(a) alternative measures of product success, (b) alternative approaches of constructing 
product sets in the analysis, (c) alternative predictors of success. We also assess predictive 
accuracy using an alternative approach to construct the data. Finally, we report the findings 
by category and when grouping the items by other product characteristics. The findings for 
all of the results in this section are briefly summarized here, with detailed findings reported in 
the Appendix. In some cases, details of the analysis are also relegated to the Appendix. 
Alternative Measures of Product Success 
In the analysis reported in the previous section we focused on the same measure of product 
success: whether the product survived or not after three years.  However, there are other 
measures of product success that we could consider.  First, we replicate the analysis using a 
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two-year survival window to define product success.  The pattern of findings is unchanged 
under this new definition (see Table A3).   
The next measure of success that we investigate is market share. Recall that the products in 
the prediction set were all introduced between July 2004 and July 2005. To measure market 
share, we calculate each item in the prediction set’s share of total category sales in calendar 
year 2008 (approximately 3 years later).  The qualitative conclusions do not change (see 
Table A4).  Purchases by customers in Group 4 are associated with a significantly lower 
market share, and both the Chi-square and the AUC measures confirm that distinguishing 
between customers in Model 2 yields a significant improvement in accuracy.  
An alternative to measuring whether a new product survives for two or three years is to 
measure how long a new product survives.  One difficulty in doing so is that some products 
survive beyond the data window and so we do not have a well-defined measure of how long 
these products survive.  To address this challenge, we estimate a hazard function.  Details of 
the analysis are reported in the Appendix (Tables A5a and A5b). The findings reveal the 
same pattern as our earlier results; increased sales among customers in FlopAffinity Groups 3 
and 4 are associated with higher hazards of product failure.  The implication is that increased 
purchases by Harbingers are an indication that a new product will fail faster.  
Alternative Constructions of Product Sets 
Recall that when predicting the success of new products in the prediction product set, we only 
consider purchases made within 15 weeks of the new product introduction.  We repeated the 
analysis when using initial evaluation period lengths of 5 or 10 weeks (using the same sample 
of products).  The findings are again qualitatively unchanged (see Table A6).  Even as early 
as five weeks after a new product is introduced, purchases by Harbingers are a significant 
predictor of new product success.    
In our analysis, we omit items that are discontinued during the 15 week initial evaluation 
period.  If we are using the initial evaluation period to predict future success, it seems 
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inappropriate to include items that have already failed. However, these are not a random 
sample of items; they are the items that failed the most quickly.  To investigate how the 
omission of these items affected the results, we repeated the analysis when including these 
items in our sample of new products.  Including these items yields the same pattern of 
findings (see Table A7).  
We have grouped products according to the timing with which they were introduced.  New 
products purchased in the first 39 weeks of the data period (between November 2003 and 
July 2004) were assigned to the classification set, while products introduced between  July 
2004 and July 2005 were assigned to the prediction set.  We repeated the analysis when using 
different time periods to allocate products into these two product sets.  In particular, we 
constructed both a smaller classification set (the first 26 weeks) and a larger classification set 
(the first 52 weeks).  The results confirm that the conclusions are robust to varying the length 
of the periods used to divide the products (see Table A8).  
We also investigated two alternative approaches to constructing these two product sets. In 
one approach, we randomly assign the new products into the classification set and the 
prediction set, instead of dividing them by time.  The classification set is again used to group 
customers while the prediction set is used to predict product success.  Our qualitative 
conclusions remain unchanged under this approach.   To further confirm that the 
classification set and prediction set contain new products that are truly different and not just 
related to each other, we also repeated the analysis when randomly assigning all of the new 
products in some product categories to the classification set and all of the new products in the 
remaining product categories to the prediction set.  Product categories were equally likely to 
be assigned to each set.  The findings also survive under this allocation (see Table A9). 
Recall that our transaction data includes the complete purchasing histories of each customer 
in the sample (when using the store’s loyalty card).  This includes purchases from other stores 
in the chain, beyond the 111 stores used to construct covariates and identify when a product 
is introduced and how long it survived.  To investigate how the findings are affected by the 
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inclusion of purchases from other stores, we repeated the analysis using three different 
approaches.  First, we excluded any purchases from outside the 111 stores when either 
classifying the customers into FlopAffinity groups, or when predicting the success of new 
products in the prediction set.  Second, we only considered purchases from outside the 111 
stores when classifying customers and predicting new product success.  Finally, we obtained 
a sample of detailed transaction data for different customers located in a completely different 
geographic area, and used purchases by these customers to both classify these customers and 
predict new product success.8  In the first two approaches, we used our original allocation of 
products to the classification and prediction sets. In the final approach, we randomly assigned 
new products into the classification set and the prediction set.  As we might expect, the 
findings are strongest when we focus solely on purchases in the 111 stores, and weakest when 
we use customers from a different geographic area.  However, even in this latter analysis, 
increased initial sales to Harbingers (customers in Groups 3 and 4) are associated with a 
lower probability of success (see Table A10). 
Alternative Predictors of Success 
We restricted attention to customers who have purchased at least two new products in the 
classification set.   For customers with two purchases FlopAffinity can only take on values of 
0, 0.5 or 1.  To investigate whether the findings are distorted by the presence of customers 
who purchased relatively few new products, we replicated the analysis when restricting 
attention to customers who purchased at least three new products, at least four new products 
and at least five new products from the classification set. There is almost no qualitative 
difference in the results when restricting attention to a subset of customers using a minimum 
number of new product purchases (see Table A11).  We conclude that the results do not 
                                                          
8 This data includes 27 million transactions between August 2004 and August 2006 for a sample of 810,514 
customers.  These customers are a random sample of all of the customers who shopped in 18 stores located in a 
different geographic region.  Their purchase histories are also complete, and record every transaction in any of 
the firm’s stores (in any geographic region). Only 0.03% of the store visits for this separate sample of 810,514 
customers were made at the 111 stores that we use in the rest of our analysis. 
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appear to be distorted by the presence of customers who purchased relatively few new 
products. 
The variables in Equation (3) focus on the quantity purchased by customers in each 
FlopAffinity group.  Alternatively, we can investigate how the probability of success varies 
when we focus on the proportion of purchases by customers in each group.  In particular, we 
estimate the following modification to Equation (3):   
ln� 𝑝𝑗1 − 𝑝𝑗� =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑜𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 2 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗+𝛽2𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 3 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗 (5) +𝛽3𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 4 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑜 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠  
The Ratio measures represent the percentage of sales of product j to customers in Groups 1 
through 4 that are contributed by customers in each group.  The four ratio measures add to 
one (by definition), so we omit the Group 1 Ratio measure from the model. Under this 
specification the coefficient for each of the other three ratio measures can be interpreted as 
the change in the probability of success when there is an increase in the ratio of sales to that 
group (and a corresponding decrease in the ratio of sales to customers in Group 1).  As we 
discussed, some items have no sales to any grouped customers.  The ratio measures are all set 
to zero for these items and we include a binary indicator flagging these items. Table A12 in 
the Appendix reports the results. For Groups 3 and 4 we observe significant negative 
coefficients.  They indicate that when a higher proportion of sales are contributed by 
customers in these groups, there is a smaller probability that the new product will succeed.  In 
particular, if the ratio of sales contributed by customers in Group 3 increases by 10%, then 
the probability of success drops by 1.73%.  A 10% increase in the Group 4 ratio leads to a 3% 
drop in the probability of success.    
In our analysis we looked at purchases of new products by each group of customers.  We can 
also investigate whether the decision not to purchase a new product is informative.  In 
particular, we can classify customers according to the number of successful new products in 
 Page | 22  
 
the classification set that they did not purchase in the first year the product is introduced.  We 
calculate the following measure: 
As we might expect, the Success Avoidance and FlopAffinity measures are highly correlated 
(r = 0.76). We use the same approach to investigate whether distinguishing between 
customers with high and low Success Avoidance can help to predict whether new products in 
the prediction set will succeed. The findings confirm that purchases by customers who tend to 
avoid success are also indicative of product failure (see Table A13). 
Predictive Accuracy 
An alternative way to measure predictive accuracy is to fit the models to a subset of the data 
and predict the outcomes in the remaining data.  We divided the 2,953 products in the 
prediction set into an estimation sample and a holdout sample.9  We used the estimation 
sample to produce coefficients and then use these coefficients to predict the outcome of the 
products in the holdout sample.  The estimates of marginal effects are very close to those 
from the full sample and are reported in the Appendix (Table A14).  
A baseline prediction would be simply that all of the items in the holdout sample will fail.  
This baseline prediction is correct 54.08% of the time.  Using Total Sales during the 15-week 
initial evaluation period (Model 1) only slightly improves accuracy to 54.99%.  However, in 
Model 2, where we distinguish which customers made those purchases during the initial 
evaluation period, accuracy improves to 61.42%.  
This result highlights the value of knowing who is purchasing the product during an initial 
trial period.  While higher total sales are an indication of success, this is only a relatively 
weak signal.  The signal is significantly strengthened if the firm can detect how many of 
                                                          
9 We use new items that are introduced earlier for estimation (60%) and holding out new items that are 
introduced later for prediction test (40%).   The sample sizes are 1,740 in the estimation sample and 1,213 in the 
holdout sample. The findings are robust to randomly assigning the items to the estimation sample and the 
holdout sample. 
Success Avoidancei =  Number of successful new products 𝑁𝑂𝑇 purchased by customer 𝑖 Total number of new products 𝑁𝑂𝑇 purchased by customer 𝑖 . (6) 
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those initial purchases are made by Harbingers. It is also useful to recognize that while a 
6.43% improvement in accuracy (from 54.99% to 61.42%) may appear small, the difference 
is significant and meaningful.  As we discussed in the literature review, the cost to the retailer 
of retaining bad products that will subsequently fail is large, in some cases even larger than 
the cost to the manufacturer. As a result, even small improvements in accuracy are valuable.  
A limitation of this holdout analysis is that the outcomes (success or failure) for products in 
the estimation sample are not known when the items in the holdout sample are introduced 
(i.e. at the time of the prediction).  Given we require three years of survival to observe the 
outcome, and we only have two years of individual purchasing data, there is no way to 
completely address this limitation.  However, we offer two comments.  First, in practice firms 
have access to longer data periods, and will be able to observe the outcomes of items in the 
calibration sample using data that exists at the time of the predictions. Second, it is important 
to distinguish information about product outcomes from information about customer's 
purchasing decisions.  While the predictions use future information about the product 
outcomes, they only rely on customer purchases made prior to the date of the predictions. 
Results by Product Category 
We next compare how the findings varied across product categories. We begin by comparing 
the results across four different “super-categories” of products: beauty products, edibles, 
general merchandise and healthcare products.  These super-categories are defined by the 
retailer,10 and comprise 49%, 5%, 20% and 26% (respectively) of the new products in our 
sample of 2,953 new products in the prediction set.  We repeated our earlier models 
separately for the four different super-categories (using the new products in the prediction 
set).  The findings are reported in the Appendix (Table A15). 
We replicate the negative effect of sales for Group 4 customers in each category, and the 
result is statistically significant in three of four categories.  Further, distinguishing purchases 
                                                          
10 These categories are considerably broader than the product categories used to allocate products in our earlier 
robustness analysis. 
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by the four customer groups appears to lead to particularly large improvements in accuracy in 
the healthcare and edibles categories.  It could be argued that these are the categories where 
evaluating quality is on average more important because the products are intended for either 
consumption or to improve consumer health.  Notably, although Harbingers are generally less 
likely to purchase healthcare products, when they do purchase them it is a particularly strong 
signal that the product will fail. 
We next compare the outcomes for national brands and private label products. Our sample of 
2,953 new products includes 18% private label products (the retailer’s store brand).  The 
results from re-estimating the models separately for private label and national brand new 
products in the prediction set are also reported in the Appendix (Table A16).  Again, we 
observe a negative effect for Group 4 Sales, which replicates the harbinger effect.  We also 
find that the improvement in predictive performance (measured by the area under the ROC 
curve) is particularly strong for private label items. 
In the Appendix (Tables A17 and A18) we also compare the results across products with 
different price levels and discount intensities. We used median splits to divide the sample of 
2,953 new products into low- and high-priced items based on average prices, and into less- 
and more-frequently discounted items based on percentage of sales on promotion.  
We also investigated whether the findings varied according to how “risky” the new product 
was.  To do so we identified whether the product introduced a brand to the product category, 
or whether it was introduced in a product category with high average failure rates.  However, 
we did not find large differences when distinguishing between the new products in these 
ways.    
The comparisons across product categories demonstrate the robustness of the effect.  Re-
estimating the model on these separate samples of products serves as a replication check, 
confirming that the effect is not limited to a small subset of items or categories.   
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Summary 
We have presented evidence that early adoption of a new product by some groups of 
customers is associated with a higher probability that the new product will fail. The findings 
survive a range of robustness checks.   
In the next section we ask: Who are the Harbingers? In particular, we compare their 
purchasing behavior with other customers. This leads us to investigate whether we can 
identify Harbingers through their purchases of existing products. 
Who Are the Harbingers? 
To help characterize who these customers are, we divide the customers into “Harbingers” and 
“Other” customers based on their classification set purchases.  Harbingers include customers 
in Groups 3 and 4, while the Other customers are in Groups 1 and 2.  In Table 3 we compare 
the purchasing patterns of the two groups of customers using the transactions in the period 
used to identify the classification set (November 2003 to July 2004).  We include purchases 
of all products (new and existing) and in the Appendix (Table A21) we repeat the analysis 
when focusing solely on new products.   Definitions and summary statistics of these 
purchasing measures are also provided in the Appendix (Tables A19 and A20).   
Table 3  
The findings in Table 3 reveal that on average Harbingers purchase more items but visit a 
similar number of stores. They tend to buy slightly more items per visit, but make slightly 
fewer visits. Although statistically significant, the differences in these measures are relatively 
small. There are larger differences in the prices of the items that they purchase and the 
categories that they purchase from.  Harbingers tend to choose less expensive items and are 
more likely to purchase items on sale and items with deeper discounts.  They purchase a 
higher proportion of beauty items, but a lower proportion of healthcare items.   
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Harbingers tend to purchase new products more quickly after the items are introduced (see 
Table A21 in the Appendix). On average they purchase new products 26.8 weeks after they 
are introduced, compared to 27.9 weeks for other customers. The tendency of Harbingers to 
purchase new products slightly earlier may mean that we observe a slightly higher proportion 
of Harbingers purchasing during the initial evaluation periods.  However, this cannot explain 
the findings that we reported in the previous section as this affects all new products (not just 
the new products that fail).  Other comparisons of the purchases of new products (see Table 
A21 in the Appendix) reveal an almost identical pattern to the purchase of all products (Table 
3).   
Preference Minorities 
Although our data is not well-suited to conclusively explaining why purchases by Harbingers 
signal that a new product is likely to fail, in the Introduction we speculated that Harbingers 
may have product preferences that are different from the general population. If this is the 
case, when a Harbinger adopts a new product, it may signal that the product is not a good 
match for the preferences of other customers. This explanation is related to previous work on 
“preference minorities”.  Recall that Choi and Bell (2011) investigate variation in the 
adoption of online shopping across different geographies.  They show that customers whose 
preferences are not representative of other customers in the area are more likely to purchase 
online, presumably because local offline retailers have tailored their assortments to other 
customers (see also Waldfogel 2003).   
We can investigate this explanation by asking whether customers with high FlopAffinities are 
also more likely to purchase existing products that other customers do not buy. Using the 
aggregate store transaction data, we calculate Total Unit Sales for each item sold in the 111 
stores in calendar year 2008 (focusing on existing products by excluding the new products).  
We then order the items according to Total Unit Sales and define an item as a “niche” or 
“very niche” product if it is among the items that contribute the fewest units sold. Niche 
items collectively contribute 1% of total unit sales, while very niche items collectively 
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contribute just 0.1% of total unit sales.  We then average across each customer’s item 
purchases to calculate the following three measures: 
Unit Sales  The average of Total Unit Sales. 
Niche Items The proportion of items that are niche items. 
Very Niche Items The proportion of items that are very niche items. 
When averaging across each customer’s purchases, we weight the items using the number of 
units of that item purchased by that customer.11  The findings are reported in Table 4, where 
for ease of comparison (and to protect the confidentiality of the company’s data), we scale the 
measures to 100 for customers in Group 1.   
The findings reveal a clear pattern: customers in the highest FlopAffinity groups are much 
more likely to purchase items that few other customers purchase.  Customers in Group 4 
purchase items that sell over 9% fewer total units than customers in Group 1. They also 
purchase 9% more niche items and 12% more very niche items.  For all three measures the 
differences between the Harbingers (Groups 3 and 4) and the other groups are statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). 
Table 4 about here 
When interpreting these findings it is important to recall that this comparison focuses 
exclusively on existing items (we exclude the new products in the classification and 
prediction sets). If the analysis were conducted on new products it would seem unsurprising 
that customers who buy niche products are customers who are more likely to buy products 
that fail.  What the findings in Table 4 reveal is that Harbingers not only purchase new 
products that do not succeed; they are also more likely to purchase existing products that 
have relatively low sales.   
This result is consistent with an explanation that Harbingers have preferences that are 
systematically different from other customers. If Harbingers adopt a new product, it may 
                                                          
11 The findings are robust to weighting each product equally.  
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signal that other customers will not be attracted to the product. This is essentially the opposite 
of the argument that von Hippel (1986) proposes for why firms can benefit by distinguishing 
‘lead users’ from other customers.  While lead users provide a positive signal of product 
success, Harbingers provide the opposite signal. 
The findings in Table 4 also suggest another mechanism that firms can use to identify 
Harbingers.  Recall that in our analysis we identified Harbingers using purchases of new 
products in the classification set.  The results in Table 4 suggest that we may also be able to 
identify Harbingers using purchases of existing products.  In particular, we can classify 
customers according to whether they purchased niche or very niche (existing) products.  In 
Table 5 we report the findings when using these customer groupings to predict the success of 
the new products in the prediction set.   
Table 5 about here 
The findings confirm that customers who purchase niche or very niche (existing) products are 
also Harbingers (of product failure).  Purchases of new products by these preference 
minorities provide an additional signal that the new product will fail. Comparing the AUC 
measures in Columns 2 and 3 with the base model (Column 1) indicates that the FlopAffinity 
and a tendency to purchase niche products provide similar predictive information. Moreover, 
the two signals provide independent information. The predictive power of the model when 
including both signals (Column 4) is greater than when using just one of these approaches 
(Columns 2 and 3). This indicates that the measures do not perfectly coincide; not all 
customers who have a high FlopAffinity purchase niche products, and vice versa.  We 
conclude that both types of customers can be considered Harbingers, whose adoption of new 
products signals product failure.   
Summary 
We have shown that Harbingers are more likely to purchase niche items that other customers 
do not purchase, indicating that they have preferences that are less representative of 
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mainstream tastes.  This insight suggests that purchases of existing items may also be used to 
identify Harbingers.  Further investigation confirms that adoption by customers who tend to 
purchase niche (existing) items also provides a signal that a new product will fail.   
Conclusions 
Using a comprehensive dataset from a large retail chain, we have shown that the early 
adoption of a new product by different groups of customers provides different signals about 
the likelihood that a product will succeed.  In particular, there exist “Harbingers” of failure: 
customers whose decision to adopt a new product is a signal that the product will fail.  The 
signal is even stronger if these customers not only adopt the products, but they also come 
back and purchase again.  We present evidence that Harbingers have preferences that are not 
representative of other customers in the market, and that a pattern of adoption of niche 
products represents an alternative way of identifying them from data.    
The findings have an important managerial implication.  They suggest that not all early 
adopters of new products are the same.  For some customers, adoption of a new product is an 
indication that the product is more likely to succeed.  However, for Harbingers, adoption is an 
indication that the product will fail.  When firms use early adoption to make product line 
decisions or as input to the product improvement process, it is important to distinguish 
between these different types of customers.   
There are two important limitations to this research.  First, we have demonstrated the 
Harbinger effect using data from a single retailer that sells consumer packaged goods. 
Replicating the findings using data from different firms and in other categories will be 
important to confirm the generalizability of the findings. Second, our investigation has 
focused on showing that Harbingers have preferences that are not representative of other 
customers.  However, we cannot determine whether these unusual preferences are endowed, 
learned, or in general, where they come from.  Moreover, although we show that our two 
approaches to identifying Harbingers (past purchases of new product failures and purchases 
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of existing products that are niche or very niche) both have independent predictive value, it is 
unclear why this is the case. Additional research is required to determine whether they 
provide separate information about the same construct (e.g. non-representative preferences), 
or whether they provide information about two distinct constructs. 
Future research could also address the challenge of recognizing which customers are 
Harbingers.  Our retail setting, where we can track purchases of different products by a panel 
of individual customers, provides one mechanism for doing this.  However, in other settings 
without a sequence of individual transactions, other mechanisms may be required to identify 
these customers.  The evidence that Harbingers are more likely to purchase existing products 
that few other customers purchase may provide useful clues even without access to detailed 
purchase histories.  Finally, while our results provide convergent evidence of Harbingers of 
Failure, we also have some evidence that there may be Harbingers of Success.  Future 
research is needed to more accurately identify both types of Harbingers. 
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Figure 1. Predicted Success Probability as Total Sales Increase  
 
The figure reports the predicted probability that a new product will succeed using the calibrated parameters 
from Model 2 of Table 1.  Each curve represents how predicted success changes as sales increase, assuming 
50% of the sales come from one of the four groups and the remaining 50% of sales is distributed equally across 
the other three groups and all other unclassified customers.  
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Figure 2. Predicted Success Probability as Sales from Harbingers Increase 
 
The figure reports the predicted probability that a new product will succeed using the calibrated parameters from 
Model 2 of Table 2.  The sales volume is fixed at the empirical average of the sample.  Each curve represents 
how the probability of success varies as the percentage of sales from Harbingers increases.  The solid curve is 
generated from the model that defines Harbingers as customers for which FlopAffinity is between 0.5 and 1.  
The two dashed curves are generated from a model that defines Harbingers as customers for which Repeated 
FlopAffinityi (n=2 and 3) is between 0.5 and 1.   
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Table 1.  Marginal Effects From Logistic Models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Total Sales 0.0011**  0.0025** 
 
 (0.0004)  (0.0006)  
Group 1 Sales  0.0113*  0.0056 
  (0.0049)  (0.0041) 
Group 2 Sales  0.0016  0.0004 
  (0.0055)  (0.0050) 
Group 3 Sales  -0.0067  -0.0018 
  (0.0036)  (0.0032) 
Group 4 Sales  -0.0258**  -0.0165** 
  (0.0052)  (0.0048) 
Sales from Other Customers  0.0114**  0.0098** 
  (0.0023)  (0.0021) 
No Sales in the first 15 weeks   0.1156 0.1037 
   (0.0769) (0.0761) 
(log) Price Paid   0.0500** 0.0432* 
   (0.0181) (0.0180) 
Profit Margin   0.0300 0.0259 
   (0.1226) (0.1191) 
Discount Received   -0.0389 -0.0105 
   (0.1604) (0.1552) 
Discount Frequency   -0.1187 -0.1173 
   (0.0951) (0.0953) 
Herfindahl Index   0.1996 0.2134* 
   (0.1113) (0.1034) 
Category Sales   -0.1025** -0.0979** 
   (0.0340) (0.0338) 
Vendor Sales    -0.0304 -0.0317 
   (0.0334) (0.0338) 
Private Label   0.2499** 0.2362** 
   (0.0464) (0.0469) 
Nbr. Customers with 1 repeats   -0.0134 -0.0063 
   (0.0081) (0.0092) 
Nbr. Customers with 2 repeats   -0.0390 -0.0423 
   (0.0199) (0.0240) 
Nbr. Customers with 3 or more repeats   0.0038 0.0181 
   (0.0288) (0.0413) 
Log Likelihood -1,998 -1,952 -1,823 -1,800 
Likelihood Ratio Test, Chi2 (df=4)  90.24**  46.66** 
Area under ROC curve 0.6035 0.6160 0.7104 0.7242 
The table reports average marginal effects from models where the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating 
whether the new product succeeded (1 if succeeded, 0 if failed).  Robust standard errors (clustered at the category 
level) are reported in parentheses. The unit of analysis is a new product and the sample size is 2,953 new products.  
Significantly different from zero (or significant difference between Models 1 and 2): * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.   
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Table 2.  Grouping Customers by Repeat Purchases 
 
Model 1 
Model 2 
 At Least 1 
Purchase 
At Least 2 
Purchases 
At Least 3 
Purchases 
Total Sales 0.0011** 
   
 (0.0004)    
Groups 1 and 2  0.0064* -0.0058 -0.0096 
  (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0087) 
Groups 3 and 4  -0.0144** -0.0218** -0.0375** 
  (0.0027) (0.0051) (0.0090) 
Sales to Other Customers  0.0118** 0.0066** 0.0045** 
  (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0008) 
Log Likelihood -1,998 -1,959 -1,963 -1,962 
Likelihood Ratio Test, Chi2 (df=2)   78.69** 69.57** 73.06** 
Area under ROC curve 0.6035 0.6128 0.6050 0.6159 
The table reports average marginal effects from models where the dependent variable is a binary variable 
indicating whether the new product succeeded (1 if succeeded, 0 if failed).  Robust standard errors (clustered at 
the category level) are reported in parentheses.  The unit of analysis is a new product. The sample size is 2,953.  
Significantly different from zero (or significant difference between Models 1 and 2): * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.   
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Table 3.  Harbingers vs. Others Purchasing of New and Existing Products 
 Harbingers Others Difference 
Total Purchases 75.679 73.588 2.091* 
   (1.023) 
Purchases per Visit 4.026 3.750 0.277** 
   (0.022) 
Purchases per Store 34.249 34.774 -0.525 
   (0.484) 
Shopping Visits 20.204 20.912 -0.768** 
   (0.248) 
Different Stores Visited 2.841 2.811 0.030 
   (0.030) 
Regular Price of Items  $4.378 $4.792 -$0.414** 
   (0.022) 
Price Paid $3.716 $4.181 -$0.464** 
   (0.021) 
Discount Received 14.449% 12.944% 1.505%** 
   (0.123%) 
% Discounted Items 35.239% 33.327% 1.912%** 
   (0.232%) 
% Beauty Items 18.591% 16.054% 2.537%** 
   (0.170%) 
% Edible Items 30.367% 29.101% 1.266%** 
   (0.205%) 
% General Merchandise Items 22.350% 21.449% 0.900%** 
   (0.157%) 
% Health Items 21.680% 25.991% -4.311%** 
   (0.183%) 
The table reports the purchasing behaviors for both Harbingers and Other customers. All 
measures are calculated using purchases of both new and existing products in the classification 
period of the transaction data (November 2003 to July 2004). Standard errors of the mean 
difference are reported in parentheses. The sample size is 29,463.  Harbingers are customers from 
Groups 3 & 4 (n = 16,620), while Others are customers from Groups 1 & 2 (n = 12,843). 
Significantly different from zero: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.   
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Table 4. Purchases of Niche Products 
FlopAffinity  Unit Sales Niche Items Very                         Niche Items 
Group 1 100.00            
(1.66) 
100.00            
(0.36) 
100.00            
(0.45) 
Group 2 90.26             
(1.56) 
104.78             
(0.39) 
106.24            
(0.48) 
Group 3 91.98              
(1.22) 
105.66              
(0.30) 
107.25              
(0.38) 
Group 4 90.49             
(1.73) 
109.18            
(0.40) 
111.76            
(0.51) 
The table reports the average of each measure by customer group (standard errors are 
in parentheses).  The measures are initially calculated for each customer, and then 
averaged across customers within each group. The groups are defined using the 
FlopAffinity in customers’ classification sets.  For ease of interpretation (and 
confidentiality reasons) we index the measures to 100 in Group 1. The sample size is 
29,412, less than the full sample size 29,436 because 51 customers did not purchase 
any existing products in the classification period.   
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Table 5.  Incorporating Preference Minorities 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Niche Purchasers 
Both 
Measures 
Total Sales 0.0011**    
(0.0004) 
 0.0050**    
(0.0012) 
 
Group 1 Sales  0.0113*    
(0.0049) 
 0.0105*    
(0.0049) 
Group 2 Sales  0.0016   
(0.0055) 
 0.0052   
(0.0057) 
Group 3 Sales  -0.0067  
(0.0036) 
 -0.0017  
(0.0041) 
Group 4 Sales  -0.0258**  
(0.0052) 
 -0.0217**  
(0.0053) 
Sales to Other Customers  0.0114**   
(0.0023%) 
 0.0116**   
(0.0022) 
Sales to Customers Buying Niche Items   0.0066   
(0.0068) 
0.0114   
(0.0068) 
Sales to Customers Buying Very Niche Items   -0.0284**   
(0.0070) 
-0.0226**   
(0.0070) 
Log Likelihood -1,998 -1,952 -1,969 -1,943 
Likelihood Ratio Test, Chi2 (df = 2 or 4)  90.24** 57.49**  20.01**  
Area under ROC curve 0.604 0.616 0.617 0.629 
The table reports average marginal effects from models where the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating 
whether the new product succeeded (1 if succeeded, 0 if failed). Robust standard errors (clustered at the category 
level) are reported in parentheses. The unit of analysis is a new product.  The sample size is 2,953.  The Chi2 test 
compares Model 1 to Models 2 (df = 4) and 3 (df = 2), and Model 2 to Model 4 (df = 2). Significantly different from 
zero (or significant difference between Models 1 and 2): * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.   
 
 
